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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
(~EORC-E

C. MAW, W. EUGENE

l\lA\V, ORLO S. MAW and FER-

RELL J. MA,V, R. JOHN MAW
and JlTNIOR B. MAW, VIRGIL
G. l\lA_,V and VADEL T. MAW,
Plaintiffs and Appellants_,

Civil No.
)

vs.

9950

\YEBER BASIN WATER CONSERY.ANCY DISTRICT and
OGDEN DUCK CLUB, a Utah
Corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

The respondents do not agree with the statement
of' facts set forth in the appellants' brief. Much of the
statement is contrary to the record and other parts are
merely argun1ents. For example, appellants' first assertion under the hearing "Statement of Facts" is:
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"Since plaintiffs sustained a dismissal of their
complaint without being afforded the opportunity of presenting the facts to a jury~ they are
entitled under the well-established rules of law
to have this court consider the evidence which is
now in the record and which they might reasonably otherwise contend would be established, in
the light Jnost favorable to themselves." (Emphasis added) .
The transcript of the trial discloses that many
times the court offered to empanel the jury and to hear
the evidence in support of the appellants' position, and
each time the offer was refused. (Tr. 10, 15, 16, 18, 30,
33, 34, 36, 39 and 40) .
RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 29, 1936, Annie C. Maw designated
as "Grantor" and Ogden Duck Club, a corporation,
and its members, designated "Grantees", entered into
the following agreement hereinafter referred to as the
"1936 agreement":
RIGHT-OF-WAY AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made between ANNIE
C. MAW of Plain City, Weber County, Utah, Grantor,
and OGDEN DUCK CLUB, a Utah corporation, and
its members, Grantees.
WITNESSETH:
Whereas, Grantor is owner of lands in Sections
20-17-18, Township 7 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake
Meridian, as now appears of record in the offices of
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i he l'oun tv Hccordcrs of' \ V eber and Box Elder Coun-

ties, State. of Utah; and
\ Vhereas, (~rantees and their predecessors in
interest are now, and have been, using said lands for
many years for right-of-way purposes;
~ow therefore, in consideration of $1.00 in hand
paid and other valuable consideration, receip~ of w:hich
i" hereby acknowledged and the matters herein recited,
(~ran tor does hereby give and grant unto Grantees and
their successors in interest a convenient right-of-way
over awl across said lands for the purpose of going to
awl frmn the Club House owned by Grantees in Sect ion 1':.?. Township 7 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake
~lcridian, and the shooting grounds of Grantee lying
North of the above described lands and other lands
now owned by Grantor, and to construct and maintain
a ditch, or ditches, at expense of Grantees, in said Section 18, Township 7 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake
Jleridian. for the purpose of conducting water thereon,
over. and to said Club House and grounds of said
(;ran tees. This grant shall be exclusive to Grantees as
to the purposes herein expressed except as to Grantor
and the members of her family hereinafter mentioned
so long as Grantees and any successors shall maintain
said Club House and shooting grounds for the purpose
of shooting wild fowl.

In consideration of non-assessable shooting privileges on said shooting grounds of Grantees on days
excepting the opening day, Saturdays, Sundays, and
holidays, to be enjoyed by, and hereby granted to, the
sPns of Grantor named as follows, to-wit:
\Yihner J. ::\Iaw, Rufus J. Maw, Gilbert Maw, and
George )law, Grantor, agrees to maintain in a travelable cond.ition the road which is a part of the right.:.ofway herein granted to Grantees, now existing in said

5
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Section 20, Township 7 North, Range 2 West, Salt
Lake Meridian along the North rod of the East half
of said section; provided that in any year the said
Wilmer J. Maw, Rufus Maw, Gilbert Maw, and George
Maw may designate one son for each thereof to shoot
and enjoy the privileges hereunder in place of such
son's father; but it is expressly understood that blinds
on the shooting grounds of Grantees being used at any
time by said sons shall be given up to members of the
Ogden Duck Club upon request.
In consideration of the feed and grazing benefits
to be enjoyed and hereby granted by the Ogden Duck
Club to Grantor or her successors on lands controlled
by said Ogden Duck Club and its successors in the
vicinity of lands owned by Grantor, Grantor agrees to
back up all surplus water of the two creeks running
through lands of the Grantor above the present dam
located on the North side of the Northeast quarter of
said Section 20, and to turn water loose through said
dam at the pleasure of Grantees.
This agreement shall be binding upon the heirs
and assigns of the Grantor and the successors and
assigns of the Grantees.
Annie C. Maw
Grantor
OGDEN DUCK CLUB, a Corporation
Grantee
By: A. W. Hestmark
President
By: W. H. Reeder Jr.
Secretary
(duly acknowledged)
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Pluintift' (~eorge C. l\law is a son of Annie C. Maw,
the grantor under the contraet quoted above; plaintiffs
\Y. }t~ugene ~Lnv, Orlo S. 1\'Iaw and Farrell J. Maw
are sorts of \Vi ln1er J. 1\tlaw, a deceased son of Annie
l'. ~law; H. John ~law and Junior B. Maw are sons
ot' Rufus J. ~law, a deceased son of Annie C. Maw;
plaintiffs Virgil B. 1\tlaw and Vadel T. Maw are sons
of Gilbert E. Maw, a deceased son of Annie C. Maw.
The sons of Annie C. 1\'Iaw were Wilmer J. Maw, Rufus
.J. ~law and Gilbert E. Maw, all of whom are now
deceased. George C. Maw is the sole surviving son of
Annie C. Maw.
The allegations and admissions in the pleadings
establish that the United States determined that it was
necessary to acquire the land crossed by the road described in the 1936 agreement set out above, for the
construction of the Willard Bay reservoir, a part of
the 'V eber Basin project. (R. 2, 39, 40 and 42). Such
land was purchased by the United States from W. John
~Iaw and Sons, Inc., a corporation, and Grace B. Maw.
(R. 3). The road to the duck club was obliterated and
destroyed as a result of construction activities on the
\Yillard Bay reservoir. (R. 3, 40, 42).
The defendant Ogden Duck Club moved its club
house about a mile and a half due west. ( R. 46) . No
further use '\Vas Inade of the road mentioned in the agreement. The Duck Club secured an alternate route. (R.
49, 50).

On July .3. 1957, ~Ir. E. J. Fjeldsted, manager o£

7
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the defendant Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, wrote the following letter toW. John Maw and
Sons, Inc.:
WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT
W. John Maw and Sons, Inc.
Plain City
Utah
Gentlemen:
Tract Nos. 95, 104, and 106
Willard Dam and Reservoir
W. JOHN MAW AND SONS, INC.
It is our understanding that you have executed a
contract for the sale to the United States of tract Nos.
95, 104 and 106, Willard Dam and Reservoir.
This letter will assure you that the land purchase
contract does not cover your other property interests in
the Willard Bay Area, and specifically your state leases,
water rights, easements, licenses, duck club shooting
privileges, or lands other than those described in the
land purchase contract. Any such property interests
which will be required in the construction of the Dam
or which will be damaged or destroyed will be appraised
at a later date and an offer to purchase will be made.
Yours very truly,

Is/ E. J. FJELDSTED
E. J. FJELDSTED
Manager
On or about April 7, 1958, the Ogden Duck Club
executed a Quit Claim Deed to W. John Maw and
Sons, Inc., and to Grace B. Maw, describing a portion
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of the land tra ,·ersed hy the duck club road. (See Ex.
B).
The duck club has excluded the Maws from the
rlu b facilities. (R. 59) .

The defendants n1oved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that it fails to state a claim upon which relief
l'all be granted. (R. 11). This was denied by Judge
Cowley. (R. 12).
\\rhen the case was called for trial with the jury
present in the courtroom Judge Wahlquist inquired as
to whether there had been any change of position and
the court and counsel discussed at some length the questions of law involved, particularly those relating to the
IH:W agreement and the Fjeldsted letter set out above.
The court indicated what the rulings would be on questions of law and n1any times offered to empanel a jury
and to hear evidence. These offers were refused by the
plaintiffs. Details and references to the transcript concerning these offers will be supplied in connection with
the defendants' argument. The plaintiff offered in evidence Exhibits A, B, C, D, and E, consisting respectively of several copies of the Fjeldsted letter, Quit
Clain1 Deed, land purchase contract, the Solicitors' letter
nnd a Inap. (R. 38). No formal offer of other proof was
made.
The trial court made findings of fact based upon
the pleadings and exhibits, and by written judgment
ordered the cmnplaint dismissed with prejudice.

9
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The plaintiffs have no rights under the 1936
agreement.
2. The plaintiffs were not denied the right to
adduce evidence in support of their contentions.

3. The Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dis-

trict is not illegally trespassing on plaintiffs' lands
and rights.
4. There was no proof of estoppel against the

Weber Basin Water Conservancy District.
5. There was no breach of contract by the Og-

den Duck Club.

ARGUMENT
1. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO RIGHTS
UNDER THE 1936 AGREEJ\'IENT.

The plaintiffs predicated their case against both the
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District and the
Ogden Duck Club upon the 1936 agreement. The complaint alleges the execution of the agreement (paragraph 2) , the relationship of the various plaintiffs with
Annie C. Maw, signer of the agreement (paragraph 3),
the obliteration and destruction of the duck club road
(paragraph 6) , and the breach of the agreement (paragraphs 7 and 8). The allegations of the complaint which
relate to estoppel (paragraph 4, 5 and 9) have refer-
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encc to the shooting privileges clai1ned under the 1936
agrccnH.·nt. See complaint (R. 1-8). The plaintiffs'
st.ntement of legal theories ( R. 30-32) clearly indicates
that the rla in1s asserted are based on the 1936 agreement. The only shooting privileges involved are those
set out in the agreement.

\Vhen the case was called for trial the court very
properly proceeded to examine the contract to deter-

mine whether the plaintiffs had a cause of action under
the 1936 agreement. The first point considered by the
court was whether the grandsons of Annie C. Maw had
rights under the agreement. It will be noted that the
following language covers this subject:
" ... In consideration of non-assessable shooting privileges on said shooting grounds of Grantees on days excepting the opening day, Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, to be enjoyed by~
and hereby granted to} the sons of Grantor named
as follows to-wit:
J

TVilmer J. Maw~ RuJus J. Maw} Gilbert Maw}
and George Maw} Grantor agrees to maintain in
a traYelable condition the road which is a part of
the right-of-way herein granted to Grantees, now
existing in said Section 20, Township 7 North,
Range 2 ':Vest, Salt Lake Meridian along the
~ orth rod of th East half of said section; provided that in any year the said Wilmer J. Maw,
Rufus ~law, Gilbert Maw, and George Maw
may designate one son for each thereof to shoot
and enjoy the privileges hereunder in place of
such son's father; but it is expressly understood
that blinds on the shooting grounds of Grantees
being used at any time by said sons shall be given

11
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up to members of the Ogden Duck Club upon
request ... " (Emphasis added).
The agreement specifically provides that the privileges are granted "to the sons of Grantor." The only
reference to the grandsons is found in th proviso which
reads:
" ... provided that in any year the said Wilmer
J. Maw, Rufus Maw, Gilbert Maw and George
Maw may designate one son for each thereof to
shoot and enjoy the privilege hereunder in place
of such son's father ... (Emphasis added).
The intent is clear that the grant of privilege was
to the sons of Grantor with the right in any year for the
son to designate one of his sons to shoot in his place.
It is fur~her clear that upon the death of a son there
could be no designation in any year~ so the privilege
would be gone. The court held that the language was
. not ambiguous and that the privileges were granted
to the sons. (Tr. 10). The complaint (paragraph 2)
alleges that all of the sons named in the agreement
except George are dead. The only plaintiff who could
therefore have a claim under any theory was George
C. Maw.
The next point considered was whether the shooting
privileges were conditioned by the terms of the 1936
agreement upon the performance of certain acts by
the sons of the Grantor. The language is that:
" ... In consideration of non-assessable shooting privileges ... Grantor agrees to maintain in
a travelable condition the road ... now existing
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in said Section :20, Township 7 North, Range 2
\Vest, Salt Lake lVIeridian along the North rod
of' the East half of said section ... "
It is alleged in the con1plaint that the road used
to travel to the duck club was obliterated and destroyed
and "through other arrangements and/or negotiations,
... defendant duck club secured an alternate route
... " ( R. 3). It was admitted by the plaintiffs' counsel
that the club house was moved about a mile to the west
and that the road which the Maws agreed to maintain
could no longer be used. ( Tr. 25, 30) . Counsel further
agreed that the moving of the club house was caused
hy federal action, that there was no malice involved and
that continued performance of the agreement to maintain the road was impossible. The court's offer to empanel the jury and take further evidence on this point
was refused:
"THE COURT: Conceding that the moveInent of the club house was caused by Federal
action and the abandoned useable purpose of the
road would be by federal action, no malice or
breach of contract or anything else, because of
that. It would appear that continued performance of it would be impossible.
~IR. FULLER: It would appear that the
continued performance, you mean by the Duck
Club?

THE COURT: Yes. To use the road or for
then1 to maintain the road.
:\IR. FULLER: In other words, it would
excuse both parties.

13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. FULLER: I think that is our lawsuit
right here at this point.
THE COURT: You want to empanel the
jury, then come back at 2 o'clock and see if you
can change my mind?
MR. ~.,ULLER: We can't produce any evidence to change your mind.
THE COURT: Would it be correct as I said
your position is such that the evidence will not
give to this document any special or unreasonable meaning?
MR. FULLLER: Other than what you have
before you right now, we can't give you anything
else.
THE COURT: Any special or unreasonable
nature?
MR. FULLER: That is right." (Tr. 35. 36).
The trial court correctly held that the 1936 agreetnent is not ambiguous .However, the court repeatedly
offered to empanel the jury and to permit the plaintiffs
to adduce evidence as to possible mutual mistake (Tr.
10, 15, 16, 18); special or unusual meaning of the agreement ( Tr. 36, 39, 40) ; and that something else was
intended (Tr. 30, 33, 34). Counsel for the plaintiffs in
each instance declined to adduce evidence, stating that
he could not produce further evidence.
Following is the trial court's ruling with well-stated
supporting reasons:
"THE COURT: The Court rules as follows:
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the (._' Oll rt rules tba t the shooting privileges arrived at under what is tnarket Exhibit A, the
shooting privileges were a part of an overall
agreement contained in what is entitled "right
of way agree1nent," that the right of way agreeInent is an instrutnent defining multiple rights
to different individuals named therein, that part
of the consideration for each obligation is contained in each and every paragraph of the contraet, in other words, I find that paragraph beginning in the consideration of non-assessable
privileges was not an entirely separate agreement, it was tied in with the entire agreement,
but that non-assessable shooting privileges arrived at under this agreement is a right to shoot
in return for the obligation to maintain the road
in a travelable condition, that on the first day of
the instrument there is no ambiguity in this matter, that the parties are in agreement, and, that
the club house has been moved as a result of
Federal action in the construction of a large
Federal Dam, that the right of way referred to
in said paragraph is no longer used by this Duck
Club, and that the right of way used by the Duck
Club is no longer in anyway maintained by the
grantors in this instrument, that they agree that
said movement of the location of the Duck Club
was not for malice or any reason other than the
compulsory action brought about by the construction of the Federal dam, that if these are
the only facts involved, non-suit should be
granted." {Tr. 38, 39).
The ruling of the court gives effect to the intention
expressed in the contract and is supported by the law.

It will be noted that at the end of the first para-
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graph following the "Whereas" provisiOn, the agreement provides:
"This grant shall be exclusive to Grantees as
to the purposes herein expressed except as to
Grantor and the members of her family herein.after mentioned so long as Grantees and any
successors shall maintain said Club House and
shooting grounds for the purpose of shooting
wild fowl.''
It was expressly stated that the parties intended
the agreement to remain in effect only so long as (I)
the club house was maintained, and ( 2) the shooting
grounds were maintained for the purpose of shooting
wild fowl. It may fairly be implied that the agreement
was to be effective only so long as the club house and
shooting grounds were maintained in the same location.
It would be absurd to assume that the club would intend
that they would use a road which did not lead to the
club house, and that the Maws would be required to
"maintain in a travelable condition" a road which was
not used by the club.
When the duck club road was destroyed in the construction of the Willard Bay dam and reservoir the
1936 agreement was terminated as a matter of law. The
applicable rule of law is stated as follows:
"Where from the nature of the contract, it is
evident that the parties contracted on the .basis
of the continued existence of the person, thing,
condition, or state of things, or of facts, to which
it relates, the subsequent perishing of the persons or thing, or cessation of existence of the
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condition or state will excuse the perfortnance,
or tenninate the contract, a condition to that
effect being implied, in spite of the fact that the
promise may have been unqualified. The rule has
been limited to the situation where neither party
is at fault and neither has assumed the risk. It
has been referred to as the doctrine of supervening impossibility of performance." 17A C.J.S .. ,
pages 621, 622.
La Cumbre Golf and Country Club v. Santa
Barbara Hotel Co., 271 P.2d 476, 205 C. 422;
Johnson v. Atkins, 127 P. 1027, 1030, 53 C.A. 2d
430; Dairy Food Store v. Alpert, 3 P 2d 61, 116
C.A. 670.
The LaCumbre Golf and Country Club case involved a factual situation very similar to that in the
instant case ..A. hotel company agreed to pay to a golf
and country club $300.00 a month for the privilege of
having its guests enjoy the benefits of the club. The
hotel burned down and the golf and country club nevertheless sued for the $300.00 per month due under a
written contract, claiming that the contract gave them
an unqualified right to the money. The court held that
the principle stated above applied, that the contract was
based upon the assumption that the hotel would continue to be in exisetnce and that there was an implied
condition that if the hotel ceased to exist, the contract
would be terminated.
There is no provision in the contract for its termination except the one quoted above, and there is no
prm·ision requiriny the duck club to continue to maintain its club ho1tse in the same location or to continue
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to maintain any shooting grounds for the purpose of
shooting wild fowl. The location could be changed without imposing any liability on the club. The Maws had
no contract right or other right to have the status quo
maintained.
In the case of Southern Pacific Company, et al,
v. Spring Valley Water Company, et al, 173 Cal. 291,
159 P. 865, the plaintiff entered into a written contract
with the defendant permitting the defendant to lay
and maintain a water line within the railroad right-ofway and in consideration thereof the water company
agreed to permit the railroad company to have use of
the water in the line for railroad purposes. The contract
was silent as to the duration of the right. In a suit involving the relative rights of the parties, the court held
as follows:
"The water works could, at any time, change
the route of its main to other lands without violating the contract, and would thereafter have
been relieved of the burden. The waterworks
was authorized to own, sell, and distribute water
to public use, and the water in question was a
part of the water supply which it held, managed,
and controlled for that purpose. It could at any
time, by purchase, or i£ necessary, by condemnation suit, acquire a new route for its main. But
so long as it maintained the route given, the
right of plaintiffs was a burden or servitude
thereon whcih entitled them to take and use water
from the n1ain to the quantity necessary for the
purposes specified."
There is nothing whatever in the 1936 agreement
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which would prevent the duck club from 1noving its
rluh house and the change of location did not constitute
a breach of contract.

TilE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT DENIED TliE RIGI-IT TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR CONTENTIONS.
:!.

The first point argued by the plaintiffs and a ppellants in their brief is that they should have been "permitted to put on evidence to a jury establishing a thirdparty beneficiary contract liability against the Weber
Basin District." In support of this point the plaintiffs
claim that by writing the letter to W. John Maw and
Sons, Inc., dated July 5, 1957, (Pl. Ex. A) the Weber
Basin \Yater Conservancy District entered into a thirdparty beneficiary contract for the benefit of the plaintiffs which entitled plaintiffs to duck club shooting privileges. (See Appellants' Brief, pp. 12-20). Although
the heading under which this argument by the plaintiff
is Iuade implies that the trial court refused to permit
the plaintiffs to put on evidence in support of this point,
there is no argument to this effect in the plaintiffs'
brief. There is no claim made that the plaintiffs made
any offer of proof on this subject which was refused
by the court. The fact is that the letters of July 5,
Hl.37 and September 11, 1955 were actually received in
evidence (Exhibits A and D) . No argument of the
third-party benefieiary theory was made to the trial
court.
The court offered to empanel the jury and to per19
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mit the plaintiffs to call witnesses to testify. The offer
was declined not once, but many times. When the
F j eldsted letter, Exhibit A, was offered in evidence
the court and counsel made the following statements:
"THE COURT: That is, evidence alone
would not justify a different interpretation of
the instrument than appears on its face, it would
not carry the burden of proof necessary to give
it special or unusual difference. If you want to
put your evidence in so I can hear it, I will let
you do it, or you can stand on your record and
go up.
MR. FULLER: We have Exhibit A that we
are offering and it consists of three originals and
two executed copies of the letter from Mr. Fjeldsted, and we offer it.
MR. SKEEN: No objections.
THE COURT: It will be received in evidence. Do you want to proceed and see if you can
construe this document because it sets special circumstances, or do you want to stand on your
ground?
MR. FULLER: I don't think we can show
the special circumstance on it other than we have
indicated in these arguments." (Tr. 40, 41).
At another point in the argument the following
statements were n1ade:
"TI-IE COURT: I will do this. It would
appear to me right now, suppose I do this, let
you proceed with your evidence, empanel the
jury and see the evidence. I will study it m?re
during the lunch period, take it under advise-
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ment until two o'clock, and let you proceed until
then on the theory that you are going to show
this is an ambiguous instrument and maybe you
can come up with some authority or some other
persuasion, or two. I will do that.
MR. },ULLER: We have no authority. We
are going to stand at this point right on the contract. So you can make your ruling accordingly,
Your Honor." (Tr. 33, 34).
The record simply does not support plaintiffs' contention that they were not permitted to put on evidence
in support of their case. No record was made to raise
the question on appeal as to the merits of the thirdparty beneficiary theory.
THE \VEBER BASIN WATER CONSERY.A.NCY DISTRICT IS NOT ILLEGALLY
TRESPASSING ON PLAINTIFFS' LANDS
. -\ND
.
RIGHTS.
3.

The plaintiffs' second point is that "the Weber
Basin \Yater District is even now illegally trespassing
on plaintiffs' lands and rights." The argument is that
because the land purchase contract, dated July 15,
1UJ7, between the United States and Grace B. Maw
and \V. John Maw and Sons, Inc., contains a provision
to the effect that title to some 988.23 acres of land shall
be free from lien or encumbrance except: " . . . rights
of' way for roads (including the right of way granted
to the Ogden Duck Club across tract 95 . . . ", (See
Exhibit C) and because a quit claim deed was made
by the Ogden Duck Club to ,V, John Maw and Sons,

21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Inc;, and Grace B. Maw (Plaintiffs' Exhibit B), and
because one William H. Wilcox, who plaintiffs claimed
was an employee of the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District (a fact on which the record is silent)
recorded the deed, the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District "is in fact a constructive trustee of the
right of way property for the Maws." It is then argued
that "since the right-of-way has been obliterated and
the land made useless, the Weber Basin District should
respond in damages both for the value of the shooting
privileges which are tied to the right-of-way and also
punitive damages." See Appellants' Brief, pp. 20-24).
We are reminded of an argument in the case of
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Wertheimer, 64 F. 2d
438, 439, about which the court said:
"It is so tenuous that it eludes analysis and
so insubstantial that it merits no discussion."
The right-of-way which was excepted from the
land purchase contract ran to the Duck Club and crossed
lands which were sold by W. John Maw and Sons, Inc.,
and Grace B. Maw to the United States. The deed
was from the Duck Club to the Maws. No offer of
proof was made to show the connection, if any, of the
plaintiffs and the Weber Basin District with these
instruments to which they were ,not parties. No offer
of proof was made to present facts regarding any trespass. There was no issue in the pleadings on the subject, and this all appears to be an after thought urged
for the first time on appeal. It is entirely without merit.
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.t. THERE \VAS NO PROOF OF ESTOPPEL
4\CAlNS'i' THE DISTRICT.

The plaintiffs contend in the heading of their argutucn t that "the facts raise an estoppel against theW eber
Basin District," but it is not pointed out what facts are
relied upon to prove estoppel. The argument in the
plaintiffs' brief consists of a reference to the case of
\ Veber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Hislop
(whieh had nothing to do with estoppel), a quotation
t'rom the case of l(elly v. Richards, setting out the
elements of estoppel, and a rambling discussion of the
1n:w agreement particularly with reference to the question whether the grandsons are beneficiaries. We have
discussed the 1936 agreen1ent under our first point.
Although the Fjeldsted letter as a basis for estoppel
is not 1nentioned in the appellants' brief, it was relied
upon in arguments by plaintiffs' counsel at the trial.
\Ye point out that the letter is simply a statement that
the land purchase contract between the United States
and \Y. John 1vlaw and sons, Inc., and Grace B. Maw
does not cover any property interests in the Willard
Bay area other than the land specifically described and
specifically does not cover the state leases, water rights,
rasements, licenses and duck club shooting privileges.
:\Ir. Fjeldsted then said that any such property interests
''which will be required in the construction of the Dam
or which will be damaged or destroyed will be appraised
at a later date and an offer of purchase will be made."
It is not contended by the plaintiffs that any state-
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ment in: the letter was false. The very first element of
estoppel referred to in the case of Kelly v. Richards,
95 U. 506, 83 P. 2d 731, cited and quoted from in appellants~ brief, p. 27, is therefore missing. The plaintiffs
obviously did not make a case on this theory.
5. THERE WAS NO BREACH OF CON-

TRACT BY THE OGDEN DUCK CLUB.
The last point urged by the plaintiffs is that the
Ogden Duck Club should respond in damages for
breach of contract. The contract relied upon is the 1936
agreement which we have discussed at length above.
The plaintiffs did not, by oral or written evidence,
prove or offer to prove the failure of the duck club to
perform any act it had agreed to perform. When the
location of the club house was changed, this terminated
the 1936 agreement.
On page 35 of the appellants' brief reference is
made to Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
a question is raised as to the reason findings of fact
and conclusions of law were signed and filed. Although
this point is not included in the plaintiffs' statement of
points, we take this opportunity to explain why these
documents were prepared and submitted to the court.
It will be noted frmn an examination of the transcript
that at the time set for trial, the plaintiffs offered
exhibits in evidence, caused the deposition of Carlyle
Eubank to be published, and made some informal offers
of proof. The evidence thus adduced was before the
court and was considered in making the decisions. The
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plaintifl's declined to call witnesses or adduce further
eridence when ntunerous opportunities were given by
the eourt to do so, and plaintiffs' counsel stated that
they would stand on the contract. (Tr. 34). Under the
l'ircumstances, the case was tried on the facts and under
Rule ;)~, findings of fact and conclusions of law were
necessary.

CONCLUSION
'rhe court correctly ruled on the evidence before
it that the plaintiffs had no cause of action for relief
under the 1936 agreement. Ample opportunity was
giren to the plaintiffs to have the jury empaneled and
to offer additional evidence in support of their case.
They declined. They are, therefore, in no position to
urge that the trial court deprived them of a right to a
.i ury trial or of any other substantial or procedural
rights.
Respectfully submitted,
Neil R. Olmstead
2324 Adams Avenue
Ogden, Utah
E. J. Skeen
522 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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